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In his piece "Northern Exposure: Mapping the Remains of the Postindustrial Landscape," Kirk (2003) produces a reading of my work (Charlesworth, 2000) in terms of categories of consciousness and forms of self that radically misunderstands most of what that analysis had tried to overcome. Kirk describes the analysis as moving "toward identifying a pervasive false consciousness, with working-class lives in the thrall of an ever intensifying commodity fetishism, resulting in a kind of self-imprisonment-a hegemonic self-socialisation" (p. 181). Kirk's inability to construe what I had tried to express, except in terms constituted by what my use of phenomenological categories had tried to transcend, is symptomatic of those who constitute academic practice in terms of discussions of representations and accounts produced by others, rather than involving themselves in some attempt to render reality in its own terms through an engagement with people who do not live in or around the university and its environs.
My use of phenomenological ideas derived from Heidegger's thought was an attempt to escape the priority of the conscious individual subject. This seems to me essential if we are to grasp the forms of being of those whose forms of being are circumspectly realized through forms of involvement necessitated by forms of treatment that situate them in ways that demand forms of awareness that, in coping, foreclose on mediated forms requiring interpersonal conditions, conditional on the freedom and involvement that, in our society, are linked to income. As Bourdieu (1998) 
put it:
One cannot, at the same time, denounce the inhuman social conditions of existence imposed upon proletarians . . . and credit the people placed in such situations with the full accomplishment of their human potentialities, and in particular with the gratuitous and disinterested dispositions that we tacitly or explicitly inscribe in notions such as . . . "culture." (p. 136) Bourdieu (2000a) , like Hegel before him, recognized the essential nature of recognition, of distinction positively constituted, to the experience of intersubjective forms that are the basis of recognizably human ways of being, when he wrote, "There is no worse deprivation, no worse privation . . . than . . . the losers in the symbolic struggle for recognition, for access to a socially recognized social being, in a word, to humanity" (p. 242).
The nature and reach of uncodified exchanges of significance that vitally position individuals in public contexts framed from differentials of power exercised through embodied forms of sense that "shape" the public realm of our social institutions are something that can only be addressed through testimonial forms. What needs to be grasped are the implicate forms of evaluation inscribed in the self-presentation of those who seek distinction through the terms of the dominant aesthetic, such that the body is always exercising implicate evaluations as it foregrounds its own presence, vis-à-vis others, such that its being-for-others is always part of a dynamic of embodiment in which existence is forged as a form that inherently demeans those who are unable to appropriate the terms of the dominant forms. This means that those who are rendered negatively visible through situated instantiations of the forms of the dominant aesthetic are subject, in their humanity, to tacit transactions that "indicate" position and relative worth: Simon, it's all arahnd us. Ah went in't social [department of social security] other day. . . . There was like this chairs an' a space next to this stuck-up cow, yer know, slim, attractive, middle class, an' Ah din't wanna sit wi'y 'er, yer feel yer shun't. Ah become all conscious, of ma weight. Ah felt overweight. Ah start swettin' . Ah start bunglin' , shufflin' . Ah just thought, "No, Ah'm not gunna sit there. Ah don't wanna put her aht." Ah dun't wanna feel that shi's put aht, yer dun't wanna bother them. . . . Yer know you insult them. . . . Way thi' look at yer like the're disgusted. . . . Thi' look at yer like yer invadin' their area. . . . Yer know, straight away, way yer tret. . . . Yer feel, "Ah shun't bi there." . . . It meks yer not want to gu aht. . . . What it is. (Simon [S] : Ye'.) It's a form of violence, Simon, right. It's like a barrier sayin' , "Listen' low life don't even (voice rises with pain and anger) come near me! . . . What the fuck yer doin' in ma space? . . . Wi' pay to get away from scum like you." . . . It fuckin' stresses you, yer get exhausted. . . . It's everywhere, Simon Clearly, we need to deepen the reach of our understanding of how people respond to their environment as an interpersonal context-how they experience their own presence in relation to others as a meaning they must cope with as part of their fundamental experience of the world they find themselves in.
Heidegger's ontology is uniquely suited, I believe, to dealing with the experience of being of those most dispossessed of the resources to contest public space. The forms of disclosure realized in comportment show the "aspect," the understanding of being, realized in response: "Beings in their being, comport themselves toward their being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67) . Comportment realizes the aspects under which one is perceived and realizes a structure of intelligibility that one has to be aware of to realize one's presence as a "normal" human being. Working people, because of the modes of disclosures through which they are perceived, are "forced" to be circumspectly aware of the totality of responses that frame their presence. Immediate responses are a fundamental medium of how they are involved in the social, which is why Fanon (1967) said, "The first action of the black man is a reaction" (p. 36). This involves subordinate people in dealing constantly, circumspectly, with objective significances that have nothing to do with their souls or "identities." Their presence, as it is disclosed, is thus fundamental to their existence. The way that things matter arises from the grounds of others' comportment or, as people say colloquially, how they are "treated." The way one is treated, immediate responses to being "around," manifests forms of "sight" that illuminate how we are experienced or signified such that, that, in turn, constitutes a fundamental aspect of how we are oriented because that manifestation of how we are perceived has to be countered in our own comportment, establishing a dialectic of recognition immediately, in presence, which has a determinative efficacy because it circumscribes, in advance, the horizon of sense that locates us vis-à-vis one another. What we must deal with orients us in our own comportment, "framing" a relational form of "sight" realized in our own responses to others' responses. One's objectivity is reflected to one by others' responses that disclose one's meaning, and in those terms one responds, articulating one's own being vis-à-vis a matrix of prejudicial projections, such that in feeling how one is "viewed," one is, in a sense, forced to take on those prejudicial articulations as terms of response that produce the form of existence that can be the only comportmental response to one's being. As such, presence is the ground of existence.
For Heidegger, comportment discloses aspects, which are experienced as part of the background of intelligibility that "lights" the context. Ordinary language carries the sense of this in locutions of the kind "they don't see us in that light." To give this some historical concretion, I would like to try to interpret the relevance of Heidegger's insight in relation to one piece of testimony that nicely captures the political significance of this insight. It is the unthought that must govern any interpretation of the condition of people who are situated and determined by processes that take place in relation to immediate sensitivities, such that those so located must assuage sensitivity to deal with the depth of their unreflective experience of being-situated in such ways. Patterson (2000) suggested that "the philosophical tradition exists for us today only as it lives in the light of sustained and ongoing interpretation" (p. 212), and he suggested that for Heidegger's work to wield a political philosophy, it would need both interpretation and example; this is work that I have begun in two unpublished manuscripts (Charlesworth, 2002 (Charlesworth, , 2003 . How people's being is disclosed such that they then disclose themselves in relation to how they experience being-situated is what I would like to try to indicate.
The dynamics of this come through very well in this description of a scene that could be any confrontation between a working-class person and a middle-class selection committee, at any level in this society. What is described here is no different to what one encounters in university departments of social science:
I went to tek ma taxi badge; there was 16 people, all council. Ah sat there, expected shit. Yer know ahr they are, couple, alright, working people, rest all one-a-bi's, got straight into mi fo' mi convictions. Ah ses, "It were at 19, 20 when Ah did them offensives. Ah can't see the point of bringin' 'em up." Thi' gu's, "Can't see the point, can't see the point, what if yer got aggressive when yer pick someone up." Then thi' wrote that yer've got an attitude, that yer don't give a fuck. Yer can't stick up fo' yerself. . . . Ah ses, look, "I've paid ma debt, an you fuckers are holdin' it against mi," but Simon yer can't fuckin' win wi' these people. If yer overapologetic, thi' think, "Hi's not sincere enough; hi's tekin' us fo' cunts." . . Ah just wain't do more than that. . . . So thi' rejected it, said Ah've got an attitude problem. . . . Fuck 'em, Ah wain't kiss their arse. . . . Ah won't let them degrade me, even though Ah needed it. Ah'd rather stay on ma' arse. I wain't do more. They just look at yer, judgin' , throwin' questions from all angles. . . . Ah teld 'em abaht GBH but thi' still asked me, again, "Did violence tek place." Ah ses, "'Cors thi' wo' violence involved 'else Ah wun't a bin sent dahn," which meks them look stupid. Yer can't win. If we stand up, wi' carefree arrogant. They look at you; they want you to show yerself up, act small, act like yer desperate. . . . "Is there any remorse?" . . . They wanted me to grovel. . . . They'll put you in a corner, find where you're sensitive, put you on spot, then fuck you. Yer fucked . . . at every level. It's comical to me; I felt like laughin' . . . . What Ah'm a goin' fo' . . . a taxi driver, dealing with the worst, the drugs, drink, worse shit an you're here tranna degrade me. I'm here tranna get this shit thing. I'm answerin' to them; all I had to do was play the nigger part. Ah thought fuck you. . . . That's all I've got an Ah'm not gunna do that. . . . If I could keep ma mouth shut Ah would be better. . . . The way thi' degrade us wi' have to do it; we just can't avoid it. . . . I did ma knowledge, the drivin' everythin' . . . but Ah couldn't keep ma cool. . . . Thi' like mek you do it, thi' mek you. . . . When we come out feelin' good, we've fucked it 'cos that means yer wo' strong, your terms, which means they din't feel power, so yer did shit, whereas if yer come aht feelin' like yer med a cunt 'r seln' an' wo' weak, then that means they had it over yer so the're more likely to like yer an' gi yer someaht. . . . Thi' either like yer or yer fucked an' the power thi've got, the're in groups. It all mates getting' paid fo' doin' nothin' . .
. . See what it is
Ah knew what thi' wanted; yer know I knew what thi' wo' after, yer know the feel of it. . . . I thought do I want to go to that level. . . . No, yer know, question mi, bum, answer straight back. . . . They don't want it as an equal part, firing back. Thi' want yer to look stupid, so thi' think fuck you. . . . We're fucked Simon. . . . What it is, if you want to fit in, yer've got to look at them an' like show respect to them. . . . If you mek that effort, always up their arse, they'll tolerate yer, but that's all yer'll get. If you want respect, then yer'll always get fucked. . . . Thi' just want a few in to mek it look alright, yer know, bit of Asians at lower levels, few ordinary people. So yer get 2 Asians there, couple'r decent, 1 steelworker, 1 ex-miner, then 12 'r them fuckers; yer know it's like 5% in police, 5% in council. . . . But they still pick the wan-a-be cunts who kiss the asses. They are bastards. . . . If you want to bi accepted, they pick up on it. I just don't know, fuck that, fuck that! All I had to do was keep mi mouth shut. All we've got is our little fuckin' attitude; they want to take that off us, for a poxy bastard badge. I knew the price they were askin' from me; it was too high. There's a certain way at every level. No matter how you try they will understand us. They get us. They know we're goin' to stand fo' what we are; they've seen us before, our kind. They think "he's got values." We're easy, to stitch up, 'cos they set it up, with their questions, only way is if we sell out like fuckin' bitches. . . . We'll always get shredded. The're bullies, 16 of them, against 1 of me. Ah sit there, thinkin' you are no better than me. You're judging me, the scum out there, all I want is a fuckin' badge to drive the scum around. What it is, we weren't willin' to play the nigger. They wanted more power. . . . They want to say, "Yes he did kiss our arses," or they'll fuck you off. So now Ah'm goin' to appeal an' it'll all bi same again.
There is a kind of enforced recognition that is being produced here, through a dialectic of recognition inscribed between the positions, embodied, of those involved. An implicit recognition of the panel's superiority is, implicitly, demanded because it is a disclosing dynamic constitutive of the sense of the encounter, such that the subordinate is "forced" to respond, by responding to the context, to an encounter with how he is perceived so that he encounters his existence as it is for superiors, and it is their terms that delineate his realm of realization. The problem posed for the subjects is one arising from the subject-comportment structure of being-there as an experience involving individuals as a physical subject, such that the terrain of sense affects the physiognomy so that they have to, not merely, respond at the level of sense but manage a whole range of physiological physical responses that betray them in their attempts to project any legitimate form of appearing or being for others. It is not merely a matter of being able to say the right things but of being positioned to feel able to be perceived to have the authority to make appropriate responses that will be believed. Without feeling the authority to be-perceived appropriately, the person is left no choice but to attempt to circumvent this dilemma through honesty, to recognize awareness of his objectivity, which is then perceived as insolence. That forms of recognition, forms of "sight," are a constitutive aspect of relations of dominance and subordination is manifest here by the narrated details of the experienced dilemma of how this man's behavior will be perceived. If the subordinate fails to adequately perform prostration, he is suspected of being manipulative, and if he tries to appear honest, to try to appear trustworthy, he appears arrogant and insubordinate. Heidegger (1988) spoke of the "intentional structure of comportments" (p. 65), and we glimpse here why he saw the framing of our worldhood as emergent from a background of disclosures that constitute a kind of originary intentionality, 1 a field of significances, of intelligibility, that locates us vis-à-vis the projective constitution of the particular context, which emerges from an activity of disclosing that is part of the constitution of the space as a context in which some can move fluidly, realizing themselves, without "conscious" deliberation because the people establishing the context are predisposed to perceive responses in a particular light, and to manifest this in their nonverbal cues, such as smiles and glances, the rhythm and patterns of coresponse articulating presence in terms that emerge from the interaction. Hence, because the space is constituted through a disclosing activity that allows their being to be-perceived in terms congruent with their articulation and their constitutive grounds, they do not need to "think" about what is grossly called their "self-presentation," whereas others, differentially situated, cannot be perceived in their own terms because the context is disclosed through terms that render their being negatively.
One glimpses the redundancy of subjectivity to the objectivity of subordinate people because they are realized in relation to themselves, vis-à-vis others' disclosures of an objectivity that reduces their being, by being-perceived in terms of an activity of disclosing that renders them intelligible in ways that, nonverbally disclosed through uncodified exchanges of significance, lead felt transitivities of sense to affect them, as physical subjects, in relation to the instantiated articulated-pattern of responses that "indicate interpretations." This is a way of being-perceived confronted in responses that lead the subordinates to be "moved" as body-subjects, comportmentally, so that they have to respond to the terms of their own significance in terms of that significance so that they experience what is disclosed as there-in-relation-to their own presence, because of the significance of their own presence, such that what is there, the context, is related to the terms of their own presence, regardless of their thought or person or selfhood. "Thi' like mek you do it, thi' mek you. Once subordination is realized through the dialectic of recognition, the persons rendered subject through these felt-significances have to make a choice that follows the terrain and mode of the realization of the relational-condition being-in-theworld, realized through their own significance. Their only choice is what "attitude" they will adopt to their own violation. This itself is realized in the flesh, not as a choice but as a response to one's significance, although it is felt as a sense that realizes itself as response to one's being disclosed. The experience of being trapped, like the experience of being nothing, is an experience of being. It renders the body-subject affected, forced into recesses that dissipate projection and inhibit forms of comportmental realization that in being-recognized might be validated and affirmed through involvements that are the condition of the availability of valued forms of being. Hence, the domain of the actual is mediated by the form of the available as it is realized through a realm constituted in relation to symbolic form and appearance, as it is mediated by relations constituted by relational differences reproduced in and through an intuitive practical understanding of form manifest in immediate responses that indicate what is perceived.
Once people are denied recognition, and not involved, possibilities remain unavailable. Encountering oneself alone among people who constitute their own recognition vis-à-vis one another, through negations that mark the impossibility of one's own being other-than in terms of the intelligibility articulated through their own involvement relations, one is forced to exist circumspectly through a kind of premonitory sensitivity demanded by one's constantly coping with a world inflected by others' disclosures that are consequential for one's involvements, and for what is available as the grounds of being. The disclosedness of our "whereabouts" is constitutive of our experience of presence, which is why we need a preontological understanding of what grounds responses to how-one-is-present, such that how one encounters one's world is determinative of one's ability-to-be, as the testimony manifests. This person's experience of his being-present gives him an experience of his presence, which he has encountered elsewhere, because it constantly mediates dominantsubordinate relations in English society. It is a structurally constitutive, socially mediated form, "at every level," that propels subordinate individuals to an experience of the absurdity that is an inevitable aspect of their negation, a necessary aspect of their primal encounter with the impossibility of their signifying anything beyond how they show up, in terms of the articulated, signifying-atmosphere of the middle classes: "It's comical to me; I felt like laughin' ." These situations involve self-assertion, through assertion of the sense of "selves" or "natures" of being that are publicly mediated such that some are differentially guaranteed, consecrated in their form because their form is perceived, charismatically, as the font of all quality. Legitimate forms of perception are thus an interpersonal aspect of the everyday class struggle, and how people are seen has become a central aspect of the contestation of resources now that workingclass people are involved in higher education.
In the testimony that we looked at, the individual's positionality is constantly encountered as presence, through subordinating injunctions that secure the grounds of encounter of being in terms that are rendered distinct by one living in a referential whole that patterns those distinctions as distinct-such that awareness arises in relation to disclosures that are part of a process of actualization that is physiologically rooted in physical responses to the terrain of significance in whose public terms one encounters oneself. Feeling located involves a global awareness of one's embodiment, in terms of responsive disclosures arising from the backdrop of significances instantiated as social patterns of instantiated differences, through which others are encountered and one's own otherness made real, because beings, including primarily one's own, "are encountered from out of the world, in which concernfully circumspective Dasein essentially dwells" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 155) . This person refers "to feel the'r power" and "the feel of it"-both indicate the mode of engagement Heidegger indicated, and both manifest that it is a form of mattering, a form of "sight," that is manifest through comportment, a felt response to being-perceived in terms that aim to elicit a comportmental response that will transfigure the feelings realized in the subordinate back, via this medium, to the dominant as an experience of recognition. The committee wants to feel "the're power" through comportments that reveal recognition of their authority, but it must be real; it must be not merely said but realized appropriately, part of the mimetic theatre of the interpersonal power relations of the English class structure. And here we see again how the intraworldly involves central, relationally realized disclosures of being, the form of appearing of which can be completely different depending on one's position; hence, subject-position and form of being issue from these constitutive relations.
This whole testimony shows the double awareness of what is a basic working-class manner of respectful realization that cannot be realized because it cannot be understood by people to-whom the significance is relationally constituted differently. And this has to occur once we have institutions framed around the forms of particular groups. Hence, we see the awareness of precisely how that manifest realization of "decency" and "honor,""our little fuckin' attitude," will be unreflectively experienced, how it will appear, such that it raises the question of the only choice working-class people get: the choice of how to respond to the inevitably perceived negation of whatever they do. Given the grounds of this person's appearing, does one prostrate oneself and risk the negation that is such a fundamental interest driving the perception of the middle classes, meaning one appears as manipulative and unmoral, like someone prepared to do anything to get what one wants? Or does one manifest a moral form and then face the same dynamic realizing one's being-perceived as too full of "attitude," a category that again manifests comportment's ability to carry aspects, ethos, that are spontaneously perceived vis-à-vis the interests organizing the perception? Such workingclass people are right to follow what spontaneously arises in their blood and physiology, the "attitude" that distorts and contorts their experience of subjecthood and their ability-to-be in regard of prestigious forms associated with professionalism and "decency." Even in their responses, there are no real choices because their being-disclosed realizes within them, through circumspective concern, their being. They are realized and mobilized as body-subjects such that significance, being-there, realizes physiological responses, adrenaline and cortisol, that realize their bodies, beyond their conscious control, so that they do not even have, as the middle classes rightly negatively construe it, the "self-control" to keep quiet and behave like subordinates should. The subordinates are dominated in their experience of being through primal human "forces," interpersonal mimetic aspects that are the basis of human fruition, which become the means to actualize interpersonal conditions that marginalize and negrify, resulting in damage to people because of the terrain on which they experience being as a constant encounter with a whole physiological experience of moments rendered hurtful because of what it indicates about them. The processes triggering such physiological processes are a strain that arises through the terms of sense in terms of which people are forced to encounter existence. The possibility of anything like a "self " being experienced as a "reflexive" project, the interpersonal condition for the experience of something like a conspicuous, positively signified "self " that can be realized in relation to others to achieve particular interrelational forms that rely on the ability to project a "face" or constitute an appearance, is taken away from them by the conditions of their appearing as it is disclosed to them by those with the social resources to constitute the space of appearances (Arendt, 1968) in terms favorable to those with the particular forms of capital necessary to constitute themselves in appropriate terms.
Finally, for subordinates, their encounter with being-situated, the subjectcomportment structure of being-there, as it is realized for them in terms of the sanctified pubic culture, means they do not even have control over the physiognomicperception of their "selves," and even though the stakes are total, "even though Ah needed it," finally, they are left no choice but to embrace through defiance the terms of their appearing and be-realized as they are, to lose and maintain "face": "Ah'd rather stay on ma' arse." In the end, even the choice they make to assert a sense of self-respect is no real choice because it arises from the preordained grounds through which they are constrained and forced to encounter themselves: "They'll put you in a corner, find where you're sensitive, put you on spot, then fuck you. Yer fucked."
The very idea of "find where you're sensitive" alludes to the very domain that is used to force persons to render themselves visible by forcing their bodies to betray them by targeting the vital values, the humanity, the form of being that cannot but be realized because being is projective; it cannot be put down and taken up anew when everything around situates you in the public terms of what you are. The truth is, as ever, literally articulated in its truth: "No matter how you try 3 they will understand us. They get us. They know we're goin' to stand fo' what we are; they've seen us before, our kind. They think 'he's got values.' We're easy, to stitch up, 'cos they set it up, with their questions." The issue of being "seen" in a particular way, what people articulate as "they see us that way" in relation to being reduced or, equally, in being refused recognition, "they don't see us that way," is clearly a significant aspect of the constitution of social reality; it is part of a terrain of effaced conflict that takes place in the immediate moments in which people must realize their interests in whom they "choose" as interlocutors or colleagues. One realizes that in the contestation of resources, forms of recognition, the contextualizing of others via their being-perceived, are a central aspect of the production of effects, or the realization of states of affairs, through the instantiated realization of forms that affect others, in their humanity, through an interpersonal terrain that cannot be resisted and, thus, that is effortlessly effective through the profound sensitivities of people to other human beings. Being able to "operate" socially, effectively, requires sensing the meaning given to what you do and are, so we are inordinately prereflectively aware of our being-perceived, because awareness of how we are perceived is the very condition of self-reflection; we have to know how we are perceived to know what to reflect on or about. We must know what we are to know how to carry-on. The space of appearances, the space of "sense" constituted publicly as a signifying atmosphere arising from uncodified exchanges of significance, is a central aspect of the way that economic resources are "made" or "forged" through affecting the grounds on which people come together or stay apart.
Fanon (1967) spoke of being rendered "the eternal victim of an essence, of an appearance" and of being "part of a psychological-economic system" (p. 35). We see here aspects of both systems. It is a process of making persons sensitive in a certain way, calling them to order, making them understand themselves in terms of instantiated, projectively realized forms. Consequently, their circumspective, premonitory awareness leads them to feel affected, under what Bourdieu referred to as the effects of symbolic violence, a violence done via existential standing, that constitute the subjectcomportment structure of being-there, so that affecting someone by nuances of behavior realizes a context of significances, a "there" in which one has to manage being in the face of its realization vis-à-vis those with the symbolic power to contextualize and force recognition of differentials of public value. The contextualization is made explicit by the practical awareness, manifest in the previous testimony, of the difference between how the individual experiences his "own self," or the "I of actions," and how those present experience his efforts. What is manifest is that he is trying to maintain a basic honor and integrity, but there is a discrepancy between how he perceives this and how others perceive this because different interests are constitutive of different kinds of quality. Moreover, how this person appears, how he is made sense of, is part of the contextualizing he must deal with by those contextualizing his being through this process of signifying the nature of his being. Heidegger (1962) 
asked,
The question arises whether giving the "I" in the way we have mentioned discloses Dasein in its everydayness, if it discloses Dasein at all. Is it then obvious a priori that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the "I" of actions? (p. 151) The I of actions arises in relation to this field of intelligibility in which the subjects, as objects, are oriented by the sense others allocate to their objective traits, which is why individuals get trapped in having to produce a pattern of behavior that bears no relation to their felt senses of identity. If this is so, if this is the everyday encounter with being, then a priori access to the I of actions would reveal nothing, prior to its beingsituated, which is why we experience being-able-to-be different, more or less, in relation to how we are situated. How we are is as much a result of how we are allowed to be as it is realized in terms of how others are prepared to "see" us, under what aspect they are prepared to engage with us. It is not merely that form of personhood is emerging in relation to forced patterns of interpretation that arise in perception, as if precategorically, but that the experience of self, as a kind, a located being, forced onto a particular terrain of qualitatively (dis)colored experience, is disclosed through these encounters with significant, powerful others through significant social markets. This affective coloring of the experience of being, the realization of a personhood devoid of subjecthood, is the kind of "coloring" that all who suffer negritude know, regardless of skin color, their species is always the same and is forced on them. 4 The contextualizing vis-à-vis signifying disclosures emerges in the words "they'll put you in a corner, find where you're sensitive, put you on spot, then fuck you. Yer fucked." Again, the wording here is, as we say in ordinary language, "perceptive," mirroring the primacy of perception-that in perception we acquire a sense of the articulations of a relational whole through instantiations that constitute distinctions that come to acquire a sense so that we become rendered subject to a being-located in social space, such that being is always being-located amid webs of instantiated sense; we become sensitive through our capacity to intuit sense. As this person articulates it, others will "find where you're sensitive" and, through the medium of sensitivity, realize a sense that has affective consequences for the individual who will be cast, in the immediate moment, onto a terrain on which his nervous and circulatory systems will denude him of any capacity to not betray his own interests. As it is expressed, "they'll put you in a corner, find where you're sensitive, put you on spot, then fuck you. Yer fucked." "Put you on spot" alludes to the nature of the environing in which the physiological responses magnify the moment, and "fuck you" alludes to the primal nature of this form of contact; it operates on an immediate, pre-epistemic level, via the sympathetic nervous system, affecting the individual in his capacities to have any effect on his own being-perceived. Bourdieu (2000a) spoke of a "a body slipping away from the directives of censures inherent in the social structures" (p. 170), and we see what this "slipping," this loss of the ability to comport oneself with the skill necessary to constitute presence effectively, is rooted in. Bourdieu has spoken of "the efficacy of external necessities" depending "upon the efficacy of an internal necessity" (p. 169), and this is a process involving the physiological systems of the body as they are triggered in relation to an acquired sensitivity located in the human capacity to respond to a realm of sense that is interpersonally constituted. As Bourdieu put it, this relation of efficacy to external necessities is "the result of the inscription of a relation of domination into the body" (p. 169). What I am trying to elucidate are the interpersonal processes whereby people come to acquire these forms of sensitivity, these forms of understanding, this capacity to be so affected, the moments constitutive of a woundable subject, capable of being violated through the medium of their own humanity. Toni Morrison (1992) suggested, "My project is an effort to avert the critical gaze from the racial object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the describers and imaginers; the serving to the served" (p. 90).
The problem is that understanding the deficiencies in the representations of the describers and imaginers means showing how their accounts are both wrong and selfserving. How the lacunas in what they deliver emerge from what they are making this social practice of prestigious authorized representation deliver for them, personally.
The motif of a "hidden England" has become useful in works such as Davies's (1998) Dark Heart or Toynbee's (2003) Hard Work, as middle-class professionals exploit their institutional privilege and exploit the personal distances constitutive of the efficacy of their representations and their readership. In truth, there is nothing remarkable or in any way invisible about any of it. It is merely a racial question, of the nature and significance of one's flesh, of how one is positioned, and of the forms of presence one encounters being in terms of, such that one finds oneself with-others located in the same terms. The exclusion, of members of the working class from public institutions by processes of credential inflation that mean they can never be good enough, unless they belong to recognized groups such as ethnic minorities or women, means that those constituting cultural representations can tokenize and totemize, building careers writing about "Invisible Racism" (Wilson, 2002) , when what we need is evidence of the nature of these processes as they are interpersonally constituted. The extension of education to working-class people has made the levels of understanding of these dimensions of the processes more prominent to younger working-class people, making it very much easier to evidence (Charlesworth, 2002 (Charlesworth, , 2003 . The real problem is getting work published because those colonizing the working class through their command of the public media of representation have at their disposal a whole institutional-interpersonal machinery that serves their interests in defending a representational realm that allows them to legitimately exclude the excluded in accord with their representations. So, for instance, one can send off work addressing the nature of "invisible racism" to a journal like Critique of Anthropology and receive the following from a reviewer:
There are major debates that have been undertaken which are presented here as if the author is the first to address them, he isn't: 1.
The use of the personal. The whole of feminist politics and methodology in the 80s + 90s was an argument over the use of the personal (consciousness raising, moral highground taking in the name of identity). So to argue that the personal is significant looks as if the author has been living on a different planet for some time.
2.
The use of pain, stress and injury has also been part of a sustained debate in political theory-starting with Wendy Brown and probably ending with Paul Gilroy's latest work 5 -in which the use of pain as political rhetoric and epistemological authority is open to scrutiny. The whole of governance and the Law is based on visible recognition. 3.
Just as there has been a huge debate about the personal so has their about recognition, visibility and identity. The whole of queer theory is premised upon an argument about visibility and the debate about the shift to a politics of recognition enabled the critique of pain as another form of authorising.
4.
A huge amount of the feminist working-class work is all about feeling, suffering, stress and pain-such as Walkerdine's "Democracy in the Kitchen," Steedman's "Landscape for a Good Woman," Skeggs' respectability, Lawler's mothers, Reay's mothers. It's not as if this author is the first to understand the suffering, ontological insecurity and daily judgments to which the working-class are subject. It's not insignificant that it is the areas of political challenge: race theory, feminism and queer theory that have been making these debates. We can learn from these rather than dismissing them and retreating to Bourdieu and Heidegger. (April 26, 2004) What is interesting is how ordinary language categories, such as "personal" or "visibility," function as a kind of "trigger"-an opportunity to instantiate a disposition to manifest the form of competence they realize through these instituted procedures. With the field constituted from the texts of those they recognize, they tie competence to the texts, so that one cannot attempt to write about the nature of the phenomenon of discrimination without "evidencing" a knowledge of the "appropriate" authors. It is as if, in producing the texts that signify and appropriate reality under a particular aspect, the aspect of those with the institutional power to publicly represent, they conceptually curtail any further elaborations of the nature of phenomenon from outside the circle of the circumscribed realm of "colleagues" who "know" reality because they have signified it, appropriated it, and subordinated it to their own private institutional needs.
How can talk of the "emotional" or of "stress" or of "ontological insecurity" be constituted as self-valorizing or as "ignoring" people like Skeggs or Steedman, women who, personally, would not even speak to the author if he ever tried to enter their spaces? Have female professors like Skeggs and Steedman established exclusive institutional conditions for the use of pseudo-technical uses of ordinary language expressions in semitheoretical contexts that their published texts constitute? From this reviewer's response, it would seem so-that the use of everyday expressions like "personal" can "trigger" such responses indicates the sense that issues from the field itself, as it is articulated in relation to gate-keeping processes like peer review, prevent sections of the qualified from becoming peers. What it manifests is that categories have a public significance relative to their "public," the instituted members of the field as an institutional-interpersonal-collegial domain, and that access to this interpersonal realm is necessary to understanding the implicit, ambivalent "senses" everyday terms are made to carry within an interpersonally mediated space of signification. Those not privy to the instantiated particularities of sense given in speech-acts because academic discourse is a purely textual form accessed purely in private spaces, devoid of performative aspects, are likely to signify these significations in terms that, as far as the field as an instituted realm of sense is concerned, are ambiguous. Those condemned to produce academic discourse from a purely private realm are therefore likely to manifest, in their significations, that they are ignorant of the appropriate forms of sense inscribed in the instantiated production of sense of those who institutionally produce the legitimate form of the discourse because they coproduce it as a public form. Hence, a realm of implicit messages is "in play" because of the "private" politics from which those with private forms of capital generate what appears to be a public realm of discourse from public institutions they command in terms that are, to a large degree, private, with many knowing each other from prior institutions and other networks. The realm that their journals and conferences build on depends, primarily, on embodied forms of value that are perceived to be attributes of the "person." This is why recognition is implicitly coded into the form of the field and why using particular terms that have been appropriated is construed as "ignoring" or, even more astonishingly, as an implicit claim to primacy or originality. How could a piece of work produced from a bedroom in an ex-pit-village in South Yorkshire, whose author has no access to a university library or a university computer network, be construed as ignoring such towering intellectual figures as Skeggs and Steedman, two "well-known" professors? That the philosophical genealogy manifest in my texts is somehow construed as academic malpractice and arrogance tells us a great deal about those constituting this terrain and domain.
Indeed, one might ask why using Bourdieu and Heidegger is construed as a "retreat." What is manifest is that the symbolic realm, as it emerges from a complex of interpersonal institutional processes, is the site of a struggle to "determine the conditions and criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy" (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 11) . The surest indication that the conceptual realm of legitimate representations is serving a personal-political agenda that arises from the institutional processes we have looked at is the sense operative in such "anonymous" reviews. Academics are constituting a conceptual terrain, taxonomies that manifest membership. Those they bring through, those they involve, and those who share their position and the involvement-relations that issue from it are likely to perceive the world in terms of the grounds of sense of the categories they themselves frame in relation to this particular optic. The categories used to signify reality are therefore the surest sign of position. If our task is to signify the unsignified, disclose the undisclosed, reveal the concealed, why does the science of the social collapse into academic name-calling? That they use the authority of "issues" that they have constituted through their interpersonal constitution of the realm of representations to deny publication manifests the way in which "insiders" wield symbolic power in the name of the poor they "represent." They exercise power while drawing attention to social power as a means of disappearing the instantiated nature of their own social power. What we have to be aware of is the ramifications of the way in which representations can be used in quite contrary ways to what they avow. With the realm of the academy freed of challenge by the failure of even those who "succeed" from working-class backgrounds, those lacking any unreflective experience of the exercise of social power can actually believe the efficacy of their productions because their significations are the means by which they grasp the real, so that they experience it as utterly real. The constitution of a horizon of disclosure that foregrounds particular significations as a means of appropriating the real always conceals what is beyond its means of articulation, a means of articulation always embedded in a form of involvement, a being-situated in relation to vital forms of value generated to ensure the involvement of some, differentially, in relation to those who are excluded-those who have to show up negatively because their form of being is negated by the sources of valuation constitutive of such spaces. Behind what gets foregrounded, signified, are the interpersonal processes of involvement, whereby those with the means to invite and pay for their favorites to go to conferences and network establish the forms of value necessary for the success of those they select. Moreover, one's texts, what one can actually produce, will emerge from what is, in the widest sense, available, by way of experience, treatment, the people one can move among, as well as the resources one has "to hand," like libraries or publications, which mean that one's position is always immanently present within one's texts. What one is likely to read, and thus cite, emerges from one's form of relation to the academy.
What the comments of the reader for Critique of Anthropology manifest is that there is a game of radical politics and radical indignation being played out as these "readers" protect the resources they need to control access to the space of positions from which authorized representation can be made. They protect the resources that publications are by demanding their own relation to academic practice, as it is manifest in their encyclopedic knowledge of what should be cited. Any ordinary language category, like "visibility," is seized on as manifesting an ignorance of the relevant radical literature having to do with race, gender, gay, or disability studies so that they can do what they must do to constitute themselves as radical intellectuals, rather than intel-lectually superficial, rather obtuse middle-class people who manifest their class dispositions in how they operate. They make the realm of representations serve particular social interests. There are simply too many processes constituting the representational realm for advances in social understanding to take place. The realm of the representational emerges from processes of segregation that arise within the universities, within departments, whose social logic arises from the logic of segregation at the heart of our society. And this segregation is manifest in the lack of charity with which texts from alternative positions are treated. It has to be this way, once one understands how the field is constituted to be a resource, in conditions in which there are now too many students involved at all levels, which means that the real conflict over resources has moved onto the terrain of the symbolic and representational, manifest in any attempt to get the publications necessary to actually contest academic posts. It is institutional politics all the way through that constitutes the space. The few who get to the postgraduate level from the working class see starkly the results of all of this, at the discursive, representational level: "The academic game requires you to write in this form but it's unexamined, and you have to ask whether any of it gets anything real and whether reality actually matters?"
What this student expresses makes clear what Bourdieu (1984) said when he described sociological knowledge as being of a "sort which tends to disqualify . . . the information the dominated derive in practical form from their ordinary experience," leading to the constitution of a "discourse which, rather than giving understanding, dictates a standpoint, and, far from providing the means of relating particular, practical information to general information, is content to shunt individual experiences into the appropriate general frameworks" (p. 464). That social science is experienced in these ways is manifest in the following:
It's the impossibility of the whole fucking enterprise that does you. You're let in; you're meant to be there to understand these fuckin' awful things that are going on and you can't really say what is what because it's politically offensive, it's too negative, or making out their trapped, or its portraying them as an underclass or it's biologically determinist. You spend your life pretending to have read their work and saying to students, "Oh you should read such-and-such on that," and all you need is the fucking references. You don't need any fucking understanding and that's what it's about: the fuckin' reproduction of the fuckin' discipline, that's what it's about and if you try to really say anything about what it's really like, then it's too personal or its anecdotal. This is all you fucking get from them, so what you end up doing is not having the conversations. You end up not even trying to talk to the people in the department except about stuff to do with the department. You just have to give up on any idea of communicating. I have more interesting conversations with my mum. My sources of knowledge are not the fucking universities. They're a waste of time, I can tell you.
acts "below the level of consciousness and beneath the very revolt which" it can "provoke" (p. 52) and argued that as long as agents act on the basis of a subjectivity that is the unmediated internalization of objectivity, they cannot but remain the "apparent subjects of actions which have the structure as subject" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 49) . I hope that my attempted analyses, here, cast some light on the nature of these processes as they are interpersonally instantiated and experienced by the subordinate.
3. Again, this is a practical acknowledgment of the impossibility of presenting self as a means of manipulating others. Given that careful presentation of self as a prelude to rulership over others is central to the way of being of middle-class people, we would expect middle-class people to realize conditions in which they are suspicious of these forms when they relate to people from different social positions.
4. We might ask, in relation to Wilson's (2002) piece "Invisible Racism," invisible to whom? 5. There is a verbal slippage here; one has to be worried by the suggestion that any possible configuration of sense around the semantic cluster "pain, stress, and injury" could "start with" and "end" with two favoured authors. More sickeningly, within the week that my piece was rejected from the journal, one of the people I quoted in the piece committed suicide. Any idea that academic publication, and any aspect of the academic game, is about witnessing and evidencing everyday forms of human misery, has to be jettisoned. As this reviewer's comments make clear, they do not care for testimony or evidence, they care only about the field as a collective resource, and they use the mechanisms of representation to ally themselves so that it has real personal and economic benefits, so that they get known, get invited, travel, they carry out a whole private-personal agenda, through networking through "public" institutions, and the system of anonymous reviewing protects them from an serious investigation. Having named the world, they create tokens, "pain, stress, injury" and forms of representation, constituted authorities, "Wendy Brown and . . . Paul Gilroy" that are used to protect the space of representation through a censorship of form and they render invisible truths significant to their own practices. The hallmark of a powerful group is to render unsayable the sources of its own power, so that whole areas are defined as politically reactionary and politically incorrect.
